Anthropologising history and historicising social sciences

Anthropologising history and historicising social sciences do not constitute an antithesis. If it appears so, it is only because we confuse ourselves. A confusion pretty much the same as the dichotomy between man and nature, and social and natural sciences. The anthropologist, by arguing and believing that knowing our contemporary situation help us understand the past more reflexively, assumes that the knowledge of current affairs merits more validity and helps to discard teleological assumptions by first isolating them. But really there is no genuine distinction between knowing the now and the past, for neither of them claims a transcendental God’s view from above. The anthropologist knows himself just as little as the historian knows his subjects. For phenomenology is something too mystical. The only thing separating the two is custom of reasonableness and acceptibility. The anthropologist thought he understood his world only because he agreed with it, he doesn’t know it. Just as Newton didn’t understand what it was even though he discovered “gravity”, the anthropologist doesn’t know what his world is, that is, “be”. Both the historicising and anthropologising tendencies result from an agnosticism which too often is obscured as some valid methodology for achieving knowledge, while in fact we are just clinging to certain norms. It’s not anthropologising nor historicising that’s the problem, it’s something we can’t speak of with clarity. The discovery of free will is not a result of immodest liberty but of genuine scepticism, moderation and tolerance. For all we do not know.

2012
01/13
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On the distribution of imagination

後で書く

Points to make:

1. To what extent can one argue that the rules of intuition belong solely to sensibility?

2. To what extent can one argue that the categories of original apperception belong to the understanding alone?

3. Or, do these two questions simply not make sense at all?

4. Does the negative answer to this question lead to Nishida’s 「直観」「直接経験」？

 

To No. 1 & 2, note 32 in the Critique of Pure Reason (Cambridge Edition of Kant’s works) seems to imply that Kant did not manage to elaborate on these questions in a way satisfactory enough for himself. And editor’s footnote on p. 239 states that even today the answer to question No. 1 remains controversial.

2011
08/19
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何をやって行けばよいか

始まりは社会学、理論社会学、政治哲学辺りでしたが、それから段々それらを問題視してきて、今はもう完全に認識論や形而上学に陥ったのですね。それだけ今やってることを続けられるかは分かりませんが、その基礎を無くしては本来の分野に戻ることも無意味なのでしょう。現在考え直してみれば、オックスフォードで現代日本社会研究をすることには、僕は向いてないかもしれませんね。そこらへんで出来るのは現代思想史しかないのですが、やはりそれが一番関心に近いからね、まずその史的方法をこなすにほかならない。まあ、別の道もあるのだが、例えば政治学とか社会学とかを、それらの方法論を中心にやっていくということ。とは言え、指導教師がどれほどこういうやり方に賛成してくれるかは疑問ですし、実験科学的なリサーチもやらねばならぬ。というところにはやっぱ引っかかっちゃうがちなので、あえてその道をやめることにしました。今日は『善の研究』第二編を読んでいます。

2011
07/29
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Traditional Metaphysics

That Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason still falls within the bounds of traditional metaphysics can be inferred from the statement that occurs at the very outset of the work:

The effect of an object on the capacity for representation, insofar as we are affected by it, is sensation. That intuition which is related to the object through sensation is called empirical. The undermined object of an empirical intuition is called appearance.

I call that in the appearance which corresponds to sensation its matter, but that which allows the manifold of appearance to be ordered in certain relations I call the form of appearance. Since that within which the sensations can alone be ordered and placed in a certain form cannot itself be in turn sensation, the matter of all appearance is only given to us a posteriori, but its form must all lie ready for it in the mind a priori, and can therefore be considered separately from all sensation.

(1). Now, if sensation, that is, the effect of an object, is to be realized ON –– that is, NOT independent of –– the capacity for representation (sensibility), and if appearance is ultimately the product of sensation –– that is, therefore, also ultimately depends on the capacity for representation (sensibility), then how could one speak of anything like “that in appearance which corresponds to sensation as its (appearance’s) matter”? For this very “matter” does not subsist, hence signifies nothing, when the object is removed.

If we reformulates this process, then it goes as follows:

[Sensibility x Object] → [Appearance = Object of Empirical Intuition = Form x Matter] ← [Rules of Sensation x Object]

It is quite obvious that “Object” here has been taken in a very vague, traditional metaphysical sense, for we are certain of nothing about the Object, but only Appearance. Both form and matter only pertain to appearance, that is, has nothing whatsoever to do with object in itself, object that be. So the formula can be rewritten as follows:

[Sensibility] → [Appearance = Object of Empirical Intuition = Form x Matter] ← [Rules of Sensation]

Apparently, this is a formula favored by the absolute idealists.

(2). In the same way we can deal with the “form” of appearance. If sensation, that is, the effect of an object, is to be realized ON –– that is, NOT independent of –– the capacity for representation (sensibility), and if appearance is ultimately the product of sensation –– that is, therefore, also ultimately depends on the capacity for representation (sensibility), then how could one speak of anything like “that within which the sensations can alone be ordered and placed in a certain form,” which “must lie…in the mind a priori,” and which “can therefore be considered separately from all sensation”? For since sensibility –– that is, the capacity for representation, conditions which make sensation and hence appearance at all possible –– is constitutive of all sensation, to say sensation can be ordered in sensibility alone is to say sensibility is ordered by sensibility also, which is contradictory.

The Kantian system, although denies the possibility to know things in themselves, relies on the premise that unknown objects nevertheless exist, which is just as goundless as any propositions regarding the properties of their existence. And because of the premise of the “Object,” there is created a middle, incomplete, retarded state of cognition, which is called sensation –– namely, the provocation of the sensibility by the “Object” –– and which yet does not create a finite appearance. But it is entirely impossible to distinguish between the “Object” and the shapeless, formless, thing (or rather nothing).

 

2011
07/21
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ブログは本当に不労愚になっちゃう

六月に何も書いていないね。

二日間前に全体主義の政治思想のテストを終え、意外と簡単だった。噂によれば先生が問題用紙を書いてる頃、寝てしまったらしい。まあ、主になってる前半のリーディイングは

  • ルートヴィヒ・フォン・ミーゼス『Omnipotent Government: The Rise of the Total State』
  • フリードリヒ・アウグスト・フォン・ハイエク『隷従への道――全体主義と自由』
  • カール・ライムント・ポッパー『開かれた社会とその敵　vol. 1 & 2』『歴史主義の貧困』

五冊だったけど、二冊しか読んでいない気がするね。ミーゼスとハイエクは殆ど同じ立場だから。ポッパーの三冊もほぼ一緒。それゆえ、テストを易しくするべからざるとは思った。にも拘らず…ああぁ

そもそもなぜこの五冊を選んだか。私の臆見だが、先生は学生の気持ちを配慮してるのではないかと。或はその逆か。っていうのは、先生も、その三人の著者は例外なしに親イギリス派だからです。それとも両方に理由があるかもしれませんね。それに加えて、図書館の蔵書は少なさ過ぎることも原因となってるんでしょうね。

ミーゼスの『Omnipotent Government』は和訳がないらしいだが、それは理解できる、訳す価値がないから。一つ、彼は「市場の失敗」をまったく信じない。もう一つ、純粋な理論的経済学にすぎない。それに、その時代に流行ってた「論理実証主義」に影響されてた故に、前後矛盾しているところが多い。彼は、確かにリカードを引用した記憶があるので、それはかなり、方法論的にはおかしすぎる。

「論理実証主義」に於いては、ハイエクもポッパーも同じ気がします。『歴史主義の貧困』の最後の３０−３１セクションだけが、そんなに悪くないと思われる。しかし、『開かれた社会とその敵』と同じように、「唯名論」と「本質主義」との区別は甘過ぎるのではないかと思わせる。要するに、その二つの極端の間に「概念化」と「視点」という認識論上の欠くべからざる一般概念が論ざれていないことである。

後半のは殆どアレントのもので、少しは面白くなると考えられる。テストはもう受けないつもりだが、エッセイを書くことにした。ずっとアレントに興味を持ってたからね。

2011
07/02
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Some very brief notes on Totalitarianism and Democracy

*The central point is mass society and pluralist society can be measured in identical terms.
.
(Zero). Two Equilibriums (zero meaning empirically impossible):
(1). Absolute Identity;
(2). Absolute Non-Identity.
None of them assumes domination
.　
(I). Two modes of domination:
(1). Domination (A) through identity, with an element of (b) in it [hereafter as (A-b)];
(2). Domination (B) through non-identity, with an element of (a) in it [hereafter as (B-a)].
Each is criticized by the other self-righteous camp as non-democracy.
.
(II). Both can go extreme and dissolve:
(1). Mode (A-b) mainly through external confrontation;
(2). Mode (B-a) mainly through internal dissolution.
.
.
*Within each mode of domination and within each mode of extremity, there are infinite numbers of subdivisions of these very modes, when one either shifts from the micro-level to the macro-level perspective, or shifts the other way around:
 　
(III). On Domination:
.
(1). Domination (A-b) presupposes externally an equal power relation with other non-identities (hence higher-level B, see Dynamic below), and internally individual differentiation is limited to an optimal minimum (hence b in A = A-b).
(1). Dynamic: (A-b) becomes Domination (B-a), according to the ascending viewpoint–that is, if there is a higher level of domination. For when (A-b) is itself seen as an element of an internal domination, the balance of non-identities in the very domination must be increased to an optimal maximum that is (B), and (a) to an optimal minimum.
(Hence here the ascending view = b → B)
.
(2). Domination (B-a) presupposes internally an unequal power relation of one identity to the other or others (hence a in B = B-a) (hence lower-level A, see Dynamic below), and externally it must have achieved domination over others.
(2). Dynamic: (B-a) becomes Mode (A-b), according to the descending viewpoint–that is, if there is a lower level of domination. For when (B-a) is itself seen as an encompassing domination, the identity of the ruling group must be increased to an optimal maximum that is (A), and (b) to an optimal minimum.
(Hence here the descending view = a → A)
.
(3). So, … (A-b)-(B-a)-(A-b) …
.
(4). Domination is NOT a hierarchy. This is perhaps the most important point to make here. We have so far spoken only of the descending and ascending of perspective, and never spoken of anything like the descending or ascending of the participants in power politics. Power operates, and always, on the same level, there is nothing like a pyramid. The illusion of it is solely produced by the shifting of viewpoint. All we have, in fact, is association and dissociation of individuals, and associations and dissociations of existing associations, and so forth. A pattern of association, e.g., …(A-b)-(B-a)-(A-b)… could be distorted into … (B-a)-(A-b)-(B-a)…, not because there are any layers in political power which is expressed as follows:
:　　　:
:　　　:
:　　　:
A　　　B
:　　　:
b　　　a
:　　　:
:　　　:
:　　　:
but only because of the process of horizontal re-coupling.
.　
(IV). On Dissolution: Dissolution of any mode of domination can not be taken to mean the end of domination, but only that one mode is transmogrified into another, hence see section (III)
2011
05/25
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Bauman’s Criticism of Social-causal Explanation of Moral Norms

Bauman’s criticism of Durkheim in chapter 7 of Modernity and the Holocaust seems unjustifiable, for there’s involved an asymmetrical formalization of the latter’s substantive language.

In Durkheim, morality and conscience collective certainly have a normative connotation; immorality is seen as abnormal and hence as a failure of social integration. Bauman, however, formalizes this language in an unbalanced way: (1) immorality and morality are still kept as substantively distinct, (2) while social integration and disintegration are formalize as an abstract universal which can be seen essentially as one and the same thing — society, so it becomes possible to say that immorality is the success of social integration. Here is a subtle process of abstraction and reification.

Suppose there is instead a symmetrical formalization, then the result will be much more satisfactory: morality and immorality are subsumed into a non-evaluative category which can be called, say, the ‘ethical sphere’; correspondingly, conscience collective or the lack of it can be abstracted into what may be named ‘institutional sphere’. So we can put the four concepts into a symmetrically formalized language: the ‘ethical sphere’ is the manifestation of the ‘institutional sphere’. Here, on both sides, the qualitative features are removed from evaluation, though this is, from a certain evaluative point of view, not a good thing.

In a sense, when criticizing formalism in social science — the sociological reduction, Bauman himself, unwittingly, fell into its trap.

2011
05/19
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A note on Luhmann

It seems rather bizarre for Luhmann to say that law’s function proper is to produce and maintain normative expectations. For, law, in a circular, though not closed, relationship with itself, is also in itself this very normativity, and indeed, Luhmann himself admits that the normativity of expectations is sustained by dissent/deviation/disappointment management which is the “function” of politics and ethics. So, why is it its proper/exclusive function to produce normativity?! There are only differences in degree, when compared with the functional equivalents in other social systems (e.g. parliament politics). The reason for this confusion lies in the fact that Luhmann draws a rather conventional, or even commonsensical distinction between systems’ normative closure and cognitive openness, between internal and external communications, between consent and dissent. The key concept for systems theories is communication, but this is necessarily a “dialectic”. However, in Luhmann’s theory there is a systematic exclusion of the importance of value-relevance and perspectivity in conceptualising the above distinctions, which then leads to the view that parliamentary politics does not have as its aim the maintenance of norms (values). The distinction between politics and law is rather this — that law is to maintain a supra-normative normativity which absorbs, while politics is to impose specific normativity, or, from law’s perspective, its pre-configuration. The thesis that the production and maintenance of normative expectations is law’s proper function as to distinguish it from all other social systems, therefore, seems quite simplistic. A connected aspect that Luhmann does not deal with sufficiently is precisely what Parsons is keen on — inter- or trans-system integration, though therein one sees another form of teleological-functional explanation of society. Of course this note does not do Luhmann’s theory as whole much justice, but only to clarify a scheme of definition. The central problem is always one and the same raised by Simmel, “how is society possible?” The operational closure of a social system does not have a metaphysical basis.

2011
05/11
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